Mendiola Massacre Facts « Filipino Voices

Mendiola Massacre Facts

January 22nd, 2010 by cocoy

No one will doubt that 1986 was a watershed year. From the Philippines came euphoria, a newfound momentum that had Democracy racing across the world. The fact that a revolution occurred without bloodshed was remarkable. It catapulted a widow who had no experience in politics to become the first woman President of the Philippines. “People Power”, more than a few people called it, “miracle.”

Power Power made you proud to be Filipino.

Was it enough to overshadow the evil that men do?

Eleven months into Corazon Aquino’s Presidency, the tentacles of greed and lust for power by the Militant Left for their own selfish ends would rear its ugly head. On the 22^th of January 1987, barbed wires, and riot police would stand between a rowdy protesting crowd and the Presidential palace. It wasn’t something one would associate with a government that won because of People Power. On that Black Thursday, Jaime Tadeo of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP, Philippine Peasant Movement) urged on protesters to march from the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Quezon City to Mendiola.

Twelve people lost their lives that day because of Jaime Tadeo and the militant left’s bid for power.

To think that that tragedy started that day would be a mistake.

According to, “Policy Paper on Agrarian Reform,” Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas written on May 12, 1986, in 1972, former President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2. That Proclamation declared the entire Philippines as a Land Reform area and in Marcos’ words, “to free the peasant from their bondage to the soil”. A month later, Presidential Decree 27 would reduce and limit that program to rice and corn lands and with tenant farms having to pay amortization for the land.

The policy paper sought confiscation of Marcos crony land and its redistribution. The termination of amortization payments for tenant farmers and the expropriation of private agriculture lands regardless of whether it is foreclosed by banks.[i]

That’s what Jaime Tadeo and the KMP wanted: a radical shift in agrarian reform.

The Supreme Court En Banc had this to say about that dark day.[ii] The following are the events that transpired on that day:

Eight days and seven nights before Black Thursday, the KMP had camped out in front of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, specifically the Philippine Tabacco Administration Building, which was along Elliptical Road in Quezon City.

Jaime Tadeo, then National President of KMP presented their “genuine agrarian reform” demands, which were documented in their policy paper.

Land must be given for free to farmers.
Landlords will no longer hold lands and,
There will no longer be amortizations of land payments.

MAR officials led by then Minister Hehrson Alvarez had a dialogue with the militant farmers on January 15, 1987.

On January 19, 1987 marked the arrival of Jaime Tadeo and he sought to meet with Minister Alvarez but was informed the latter could only meet with him the next day.

The meeting did take place the following day at the Ministry of Agriculture conference room. Tadeo demanded minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez countered by promising to bring the matter to the attention of President Aquino at the cabinet meeting that was held next day, the 21^st of January 1987.

The militant farmers the following day barricaded the MAR office, preventing employees from entering. They flew the KMP flag along side the Philippine flag.

At six thirty pm (6:30pm) on January 21, 1987, Minister Alvarez met with Jaime Tadeo. The minister counseled Tadeo to wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (which occurred the following month) and to allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program.

Jaime Tadeo said he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform could not be implemented under a landlord-controlled congress.

Heated words were exchanged but Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from both sides to meet the following day.

On the 22^nd of January 1987, Jaime Tadeo and his group did not meet with the government. They did not engage in negotiation.

Before the KMP marched their leader Jaime Tadeo uttered these words before media, “…inalis naming ang barikdada bilang kahilingan ng gating Presidente, pero kinakailangan allisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din naming iyon at dadanak ang dugo…”

Trans: “We have removed our barricade because our President (Aquino) asked for it but she must remove the barricade along Mendiola because we will break through it and blood will flow.”

At ten o’clock (10:00 AM) that morning, The KMP began their March to Malacanang Palace and other militant groups like the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), the League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML) joined them.

By one o’clock in the afternoon, the protesters took over Liwasang Bonifacio with the usual program as they gathered energies for the march towards the palace. Perhaps it was indicative of how rowdy the crowd was. Protesters entered the eastern facade of the Post Office Building, and while there, they removed steel bars surrounding the garden and then the march towards the Presidential Palace began.

At the time, government intelligence report indicated that the KMP rank was heavily infiltrated by elements of the CPP/NPA. Intelligence reported that an insurrection was impending and the threat so grave that reports indicated that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly occupied.

No longer the opposition, the Aquino Administration had to defend itself.

Col. Cesar Nazareno and his Task Force Nazareno deployed around Malacañang. Police General Lim’s civil disturbance control unity of the Western Police District was likewise activated.

The first line of defense was the Western Police District under their ground commander, Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the WPD. This line was deployed at the intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets. These units of the WPD were armed with aluminum shields, truncheons and gas masks.

At ten yards behind them, the Integrated National Police from the 61^st and 62^nd INP Field Force carrying truncheons, shiels and gas mask was under the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz. They formed the second line of defense.

The third line of defense for the palace was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion, first and second companies under Major Felimon b. Gasmin. They were Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio at that time. This group of marines was equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles.

Situated behind the marines were four 6×6 trucks and followed by two water cannons on each side of Mendiola as well as eight fire trucks, four on each side. The fire trucks were to supply water to the water cannons. Two Mobile Dispersal Teams armed with two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and team leader also held ground here.

It was decided by government forces at the time that Colonel Torres and Major Francisco were to be government negotiators.

At four o’clock in the afternoon, a crowd of 10,000 to 15,000 unruly crowd reached C.M. Recto Avenue and the police line stood to greet them. No negotiation took place. No dialogue ever opened.

All hell broke lose as an explosion shattered the peace.

Pillboxes, stones, bottles where thrown. Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police line was breached but when shots were fired, demonstrators withdrew towards CM Recto as government forces continued to fire sporadically.

Two MDTs were deployed towards Legarda Street to lob tear gas at the protesters.

When the dust settled, twelve marchers died. Thirty-nine people were wounded by gunshots. Twelve received minor injuries.

On the government side, three sustained gunshot wounds. Twenty suffered minor physical injuries.

It was a bloody day.

Right after the confrontation, what is clear, President Aquino issued Administrative Order 11, which was dated 22 January 1987. She created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission. President Aquino ordered its creation to conduct an investigation on what transpired that day at Mendiola. Its members included: retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos, as Chairman; retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria, and Mr. Antonion U. Miranda as members.

On 27 February, 1987, it submitted its findings[iii]:

The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.
The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the police and military commanders were in civilian attire in violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal control units in dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were determined to march to Malacañang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo — “bubutasin namin ang barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas. . .
There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line of the CDC contingent.
The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started the firing.
At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.
The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a) there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of the marchers.
Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the marchers.
No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was given for its absence.

You’ve read the timeline of events and the commission’s findings.

The Mendiola Massacre needs to be seen within the proper historical context.

At the time of Marcos, the ranks of the communist left had grown. Historians agree that the dictatorship was the best recruiter for the Revolutionary Movement. In 1985, the left called for a boycott of the snap elections.

EDSA People Power not only caught the Left by surprise. Suddenly, they found themselves irrelevant! So there really isn’t any love loss between Cory and the Communist insurgency.

On January 29, 1987, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. wrote this about Cory Aquino, about “Making Amends for Mendiola Massacre”:

“…perhaps, she was turned off by the combative stance of KMP Jaime Tadeo. Perhaps, she was convinced that Jimmy Tadeo didn’t come to dialogue but to demand.”[iv]

The protesters led by Jaime Tadeo clearly did not care to negotiate. Perhaps, as Fr. Bernas pointed it, their actions were out of frustration.[v]

Given the historical context that the Communist insurgency found itself in, suddenly they were irrelevant and growing more irrelevant everyday post EDSA. I believe the Left’s position was a deciding factor. It is clear the Left had a selfish and vested interest in raising a ruckus.

The Left did not care to be reasoned with. What is clear is that Jaime Tadeo incited violence with his remarks. As the commission reported, no negotiation took place as the protesters broke through the police line.

The price of violence was twelve people dead. Land reform defeated before it started. The left found itself unable to work constructively to achieve their goals. They found themselves boxed into the corner of irrelevancy with the middle class showing them disdain.

By the end of 1987, the Aquino Administration waged a war against the Communist insurgency. EDSA wasn’t just the death of a dictatorship. It showed too the irrelevance of armed revolutionary bandits hiding behind the nomenclature, “communist”. Mendiola proved the irrelevance of their tantrums and their violence. You have been reading the story of the Mendiola Massacre. This is Mendiola Massacre Facts.

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Mendiola Massacre Facts