The Philippine Supreme Court is right from the very outset in stating that the essential question before it in Province of North Cotabato v. GRP (October 15, 2008) is “the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process” (emphasis in the original). The Court also cited the correct case law (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005) although relied on it for the opposite reasons and result. In Pimentel, the Court held:
In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states (emphasis mine).
The corollary issues to resolve then are whether: 1) the MoA-AD is an agreement within the realm of treaty-making, and 2) Bangsamoro, as represented by the MILF, should be treated as having obtained the status of “other states.”
First, on the essential question about the extent of the presidential power
I have argued, borrowing the logic in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304(1936), that “the basis of the presidential power to wage war, conclude peace or make treaties or executive agreements (is basically) the president’s power as commander in chief of the military” and that “while the president shares with the senate the power to make treatise or international agreement, she (or her alter egos) alone negotiates or adopts bargaining inducements, devices or strategies that may lead to a final compact of peace.”
The argument has been advanced on the basis of the following political reality:
In the political give and take of the delicate and complicated Mindanao peace process, the president, and none other, is supposed to be the “sole organ” to do the communicating and negotiating and as such may rely on a large reservoir of inherent and extra-constitutional powers of the executive to serve the public interest. In so doing, she may pursue political pragmatism or go as far as push the constitutional envelope (for example, ignore Philippine claim of Sabah for peaceful co-existence and trade relations with Malaysia, or, as in the instant controversy, sit in the peace table and negotiate with armed rebel group MILF to prevent further bloodletting among brothers and pave the way for national economic progress).
In certain extraordinary situations, the president may in fact employ the classic Lockean prerogative “to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of law or sometimes against it” (emphasis mine).
These only mean that, as in the matter of the MoA-AD that has generated raging nationwide discourse and public anxiety, even the senate (the president’s treaty-making partner under the Constitution) cannot meddle with this (negotiation) aspect of treaty making or of forging executive agreement in the same way that the court cannot interfere with the decision of congress or the senate to introduce ultra constitutional resolution it deems appropriate to institute structural or systemic change in governance.
The US Supreme Court in C.&S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) has had the chance to delineate the competence of the judiciary to review executive decisions on foreign policy thus:
. . . the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
On the other hand, I have reasoned, beyond legalism, against limiting executive power to the faithful execution of laws:
. . . there are pragmatic reasons why the classic view that executive power is restricted to enforcing the law and that the judiciary may oversee such enforcement does not apply when it comes to military (and foreign) affairs: 1) the need for secrecy, and 2) the president has access to information that may not be available to the judiciary (or congress) such as conditions and political dynamics on the ground or details in operations that cannot be shared without jeopardizing those operations. In these areas, the political judgment of the executive may not be replaced by judicial discretion, the president being accountable only to the public as a whole.
By replacing the political judgment of the executive with judicial discretion on matters concerning the management of hostilities in Mindanao to make way for peace, the Court has arrogated unto itself the role of primus inter pares (first among equals) in our government triad of co-equality and made, to employ the language of Chief Justice Puno, a “burlesque of the Constitution.”
The majority in Cotabato has attempted to conceal or confound the Court’s unconstitutional invasion of executive power by conveniently partitioning the presidential personality into a good cop/bad cop split:
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001. The said executive order requires that “[t]he government’s policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order.”
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3 (italicization and underlining in the original).
x x x
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.”
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to “[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process.” E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be “the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives.”
x x x
(Presidential Adviser on Peace Process Esperon) committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President.
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents’ retort in justifying the denial of petitioners’ right to be consulted. Respondents’ stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people’s participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined (emphasis and italicization in the original).
The hair-splitting prompted veteran journalist Ding G. Gagelonia to claim that the presidential alter egos have been scapegoated or hotshot Pinoy blogger Dean Jorge Bocobo to suggest a cavalier disregard of the principle of command responsibility. The subterfuge however behind the bad cop/good cop imitation in Cotabato is purposely to hold the president’s alter egos accountable while skirting around the unquestionable predominance of the presidential competence in matters of foreign, military and national security affairs such as the pursuit of peaceful settlement of the Mindanao conflict, which the judiciary is constitutionally forbidden to intrude.
The core objection to the MoA-AD, it should be noted, is the assertion that by its terms the government peace panel has committed to concede therein powers to the Bansamoro Juridical Entity that are not in harmony with present laws such as the Local Government Code and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act as well as the Constitution. For instance, it cited the allusion in the MoA-AD to the concept of association which, according to the opinion of the Court’s majority, is “not recognized under the constitution” (emphasis in the original).
The provision particularly in question in the MoA-AD is the one providing that the “relationship between the Central Government and the BJE shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility.” Relying on a Harvard Law Review piece, the Court held that “with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence.” The Court then speculated that “the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it (emphasis omitted).
The majority proceeded to argue thus: “Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic” (italicization and emphasis in the original).
So does the State of Bicol run counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. For as proposed in Senate Joint Resolution No.10 (the Federalism proposal) Bicol is expressly permitted, subject to certain conditions, to secede or dismember itself from the Federal Republic. Now, why is Senate Resolution No.10 (which proposes to transform the present unitary arrangement into a federal system) not patently unconstitutional but the MoA-AD is? Well, the Court in Cotabato found paragraph 7 of the MoA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE as the thorn in the side. The said paragraph 7 reads:
The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
“Plainly,” according to the Court’s majority, “stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the “consensus points” found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional” (emphasis in the original).
So, that’s it? The Senate’s proposal contained in Senate Joint Resolution No.10 is not objectionable but the Executive’s proposal in MoA-AD is unconstitutional because the Court perceived it as “a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the ‘consensus points’ found in the MOA-AD”? Hence, even while acknowledging that “As long as she (the President, the good cop) limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act,” the Court concluded the acts of the president’s alter egos (the bad cop) guaranteeing those changes is a “constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.”
Let’s examine then the so-called guarantee once again:
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Parsing the above provision, there is no mistaking that what it otherwise clearly says is that any provision of the MoA-AD requiring modifications, changes or amendments to the present laws and the Constitution shall take effect only AFTER the occurrence of two conditions: 1) upon the signing a Comprehensive Pact AND 2) upon the modifications, changes and amendments to such laws and the Constitution, none of which is guaranteed in the MoA-AD as certain to happen. On the other hand, the clause “with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements,” given by the Court as a reason against the conditional effectivity of MoA-AD, could have not possibly covered the MoA-AD. For how could the MoA-AD ever exist prior to itself? Additionally, “the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact” may be certain, but the signing of the Compact itself is not.
This one is plainly commonsensical: If not even Marcos, his authoritarian powers notwithstanding, has been thought by any well-meaning Filipino to have brazenly guaranteed that the legal framework he was sponsoring to amend or revise the constitution then existing would be certain to be approved by the citizen assemblies of his own creation, how could then the representatives of the rebelling Moros, some of them are legal scholars in their own right, be thought to ever believe that a lame duck President Arroyo acting through her alter egos could guarantee radical structural changes in the existing legal framework just by signing the MoA-AD (unless of course they are blind conspirators in a Marcosian design)? Not until the handing down of the Javellana decision, it should be recalled, the Marcos stratagem had remained uncertain.
On the corollary issues of whether: 1) the MoA-AD is an agreement within the realm of treaty-making, and 2) Bangsamoro, as represented by the MILF, should be treated as having obtained the status of “other states”
For our purpose, the UN report of June 22, 1999 on the “Study on treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between States and indigenous populations” is certainly worth noting:
There are numerous historical examples of law as an instrument of colonialism, such as the doctrine of terra nullius, the encomienda and repartimiento systems instituted in Latin America by the Spanish Crown in the sixteenth century, the so-called “removal treaties” imposed on the indigenous nations of the south-eastern United States under President Jackson in the 1830s, and various types of State legislation encroaching on (or ignoring) previously recognized indigenous jurisdiction, such as the Seven Major Crimes Act and the Dawes Severalty Act passed by the United States Congress in the 1880s, the federal Indian Act in Canada, post-Mabo legislation in Australia and many pieces of legislation throughout Latin America.
Yet, with rare exceptions, the discourses of law itself, including that on treaties and treaty-making in the context of European expansion overseas and that of their successors in the territories conquered, are not impervious to anachronism and ex post facto reasoning, thus condoning discrimination of indigenous peoples rather than affording them justice and fair treatment.
A critical historiography of international relations clearly shows the dangers of this particular kind of reasoning, which projects into the past the current domesticated status of indigenous peoples as it evolved from developments that took place mainly in the second half of the nineteenth century under the impact of legal positivism and other theories advocated by European colonial powers and their continuators.
x x x
Consequently, the problematique of indigenous treaties and other juridical instruments today affecting the lives of these peoples, hinges on what the Special Rapporteur has termed a process of retrogression, by which they have been deprived of (or saw greatly reduced) three of the four essential attributes on which their original status as sovereign nations was grounded, namely their territory, their recognized capacity to enter into international agreements, and their specific forms of government. Not to mention the substantial reduction of their respective populations in many countries around the world, due to a number of factors including, assimilationist policies.
This aspect can hardly be overemphasized, especially since the ultimate purpose of the study pertains to the potential utility of yet another process of reversal that would eventually lead toward renewed recognition of indigenous peoples as distinct collectivities, allowing these peoples redress for decades – if not centuries – of discrimination and forced integration.
x x x
In the course of history, the newcomers then nevertheless attempted to divest indigenous peoples, as pointed out above, of their sovereign attributes, especially jurisdiction over their lands, recognition of their forms of societal organization, and their status as subjects of international law.
x x x
First of all, in the case of treaty relations, one notes a general tendency to contest whether treaties involving indigenous peoples have a standing, nowadays, in international law. This point of view, which is widespread among the legal establishment and in scholarly literature, has been basically grounded alternatively on three assumptions: either it is held that indigenous peoples are not peoples according to the meaning of the term in international law; or that treaties involving indigenous peoples are not treaties in the present conventional sense of the term, that is, instruments concluded between sovereign States (hence the established position of the United States and Canadian judiciary, by virtue of which treaties involving indigenous peoples are considered to be instruments sui generis); or that those legal instruments have simply been superseded by the realities of life as reflected in the domestic legislation of States.
Whatever the reasoning followed, the dominant viewpoint – as reflected, in general, in the specialized literature and in State administrative decisions, as well as in the decisions of the domestic courts – asserts that treaties involving indigenous peoples are basically a domestic issue, to be construed, eventually implemented and adjudicated via existing internal mechanisms, such as the courts and federal (and even local) authorities.
It is worth underlining, however, that this position is not shared by indigenous parties to treaties, whose own traditions on treaty provisions and treaty-making (or on negotiating other kinds of compacts) continue to uphold the international standing of such instruments. Indeed, for many indigenous peoples, treaties concluded with European powers or their territorial successors overseas are, above all, treaties of peace and friendship, destined to organize coexistence in – not their exclusion from – the same territory and not to regulate restrictively their lives (within or without this same territory), under the overall jurisdiction of non-indigenous authorities. In their view, this would be a trampling on their right to self-determination and/or their other unrelinquished rights as peoples.
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Prof. Abe,
I am in your debt. Having worked in government myself, and from extensive readings and sustained interaction with lawyers of note, this writer has a healthy appreciation, and respect for the Office of the President. Nut the Filipino that I am tells me something is seriously amiss when the president’s alter egos go all the way to Malaysia, the diplomatic corps in tow to for much ballyhooed formal signing ceremonies of a historic “breakthrough agreement” with the event aborted only by a TRO from the Supreme Court.
Weeks later arguing before the entire Court, the Solicitor General asserts that the issue was already moot as there was no agreement signed. Then the Court is told that Esperon and chief negoriator Rodolfo Garcia were not after all clothed with a full presidential powers appointment and were “only authorized to initial” the MoA-AD.
Simple non-lawyer, non-legalistic logic would then raise the question as to what the scheduled ceremony in Malaysia was all about.
Moro-moro?
The MOA-AD exceeded even the fantabulistic corrections of history attempted by IPRA. If indeed the President was fully exercising the rights you claim belong to her, why didn’t she stand by her guns, as she has done in every other such confrontation with Civil Society involving her rights and privileges as Chief Executive? Why did she abandon with such guilty alacrity what you deem to be a noble and enlightened approach to peace in Mindanao. Why indeed is there a complete and utter junking of the MOA-AD. Why no Motion for Reconsideration on such a thin margin as 8-7?
I guess I would side with you on the idea of “Executive Privilege” if the complementary principle of “command responsibility” were also held in such high esteem for when the exercise of such privilege, as in this case, has led to human tragedy, suffering and war.
The main principle that the Supreme Court has upheld is our stark inability, unwillingness and rectitude in REFUSING to do anything that violates the Constitution.
I cannot imagine a thing of consensus more fundamental than that. If you and others like Patricio Diaz, Abinales, Abbas, Mastura and the rest, no longer buy into that consensus then we are faced with years of war ahead. But I daresay, most of the Bangsamoro won’t be on the side of the Sultanists.
Once we get rid of the treasonous lil tramp called Gloria, only then will a principled and honorable peace be possible.
djb,
by the way, what are you dean for? You say ” the main principle that the Supreme Court has upheld is our stark inability, unwillingness and rectitude in REFUSING to do anything that violates the Constitution.”
Of course, the SC will NEVER do anything that would violate the Constitution. On your point on “command responsibility”, again, let me reiterate and I hope your feeble mind gets it, PGMA is not liable by the acts of her subordinates. I can cite many cases that the SC has said.
I do agree on what Mr. Margallo wrote here, that there is really no issue since this agreement is decidedly on the realm of treaty-making and in no time do we say that it is a completed agreement already. Please be guided by the opinions of the Solicitor-General in this and also, the opinions expressed by the Executive Secretary.
Peace can only be achieved if government takes a principled stand to do what’s right. In this matter at bar, it did. Yet, traditionalists like you and Ding disagree and chastise us for this simply because you are pursuing ideological agendas instead of believing in reason.
Ding,
The signing ceremony in Malaysia was obviously for real (reps from great nations have signified their intention to grace the occasion). The Moro-moro seems to have begun when the SC issued the TRO. The crisis has risen to high drama with the decision in Cotabato serving as the denouement where the SC, gratuitously tilting the checks and balances mechanism in its favor, allowed the creeping forces of judicial despotism to triumph. The moral: more and more, we look askance at the exercise of judicial review as to who would keep it in leash after knocking down congressional oversight in Neri and now emasculating presidential discretion in the pursuit of peace in Mindanao.
DJB,
The fact that we have a solicitor general who may have been miscued (or compelled to read a different script) does not mean a free pass for the SC to come up with new versions of established Constitutional Law principles, e.g., that judicial duty does not include giving out advisory opinions or the Court may not proceed to exercise judicial review in cases that no longer present live controversy.
Smokey HP,
I just want to point out that what I’m hoping to be preserved are the constitutional prerogatives and inherent powers of the political branches of the government who are directly answerable to the people. The point being advanced is that the judiciary not being accountable to the electorate must be very conscious of the awe that’s owed to these delegated powers from the sovereign and the way to show this deference is to steer clear of the exercise of judicial review whenever opportunities (such as mootness of the case) present themselves.
Abe,
Did you miss the point the Supreme Court made about this? The PEACE PROCESS is not moot and academic. This MOA-AD was Part 3 of the 2001 Tripoli Agreement. It is capable of repetition without judicial review. Yadayada… Excuse me, but they seem to have a better grasp than you do of principles that even I can understand.
How can the issues raised in the case be moot when continuing war and destruction has been its result? Just because you agree with its content is no reason to twist Constitutional principles around. To me it is not only obvious, but important, to realize that the issues raised here are not moot and academic. They are crucial to survival, even if the MOAs architects and supporters are discomfitted by the need to acknowledge and deal with the Constitution.
I categorically reject the notion that peace in Mindanao depends on our junking the Constitution.
Dean,
This is no twisting of constitutional principles around but the realism is that the opportunity of the Court to correct acts junking the constitution is so limited it should make it easy even for non-lawyers to appreciate why the extent of the judicial check, when the opportunity comes, should also be narrow or constricted. Thus, much that is unconstitutional in the mind of the judges may go unchecked because judicial power comes into play only when a case is brought to them. When there is no case or the actual controversy ceases, judicial duty to act is also postponed. In such events, supposedly unconstitutional (although perhaps wise) acts of the other branches of the government become final unless the people, the ultimate arbiter, hold them accountable for those acts in the next election or rejects those acts in a plebiscite.
In the MoA-AD case, the President already publicly declared that regardless of the ruling of the Supreme Court, her government would not sign the agreement anymore. It’s then possible the President could be considering a range of political and military options including the extreme decision to continue with the hostilities until total suppression (as some in FV suggest) of the insurrectionary forces. But, what happens if, in the hypothetical, the Court’s majority, upon holding that the case may not be moot, decided that the MoA-AD is constitutional? Should the Court now lift the TRO or order the government peace panel to resume the peace negotiation?
SC reigns supreme
The brewing imbroglio over whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain that would, in effect, create a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity as a state within a state has finally come to a close with the Supreme Court voting 8-7 against the Palace, or so it was. This decision of October 14, 2008 may very well be a milestone in legal history where the Highest Tribunal appears to have overcome the imprimatur (euphemism for intimidation) set forth by Malacanang through earlier official pronouncement from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and more so of the presidential adviser on the peace process himself.
At that voting configuration, one can still believe, beyond the legalese, that the action of the Supreme Court is still slightly offensive of a prevailing moral worldview. Serious observers of trends awaited this decision as a test of the independence of the judiciary, in this case, the Supreme Court itself from any degree of political influence. And therefore, apparently the High Tribunal has passed the litmus test. If the Supreme Court could have voted otherwise, not few quarters would have mourned the death of justice in this country. In the manner it has decided in the case, it appears that this branch of government has invoked its full independence.
Central to the theme is really the matter on whether executive privilege could have been invoked, as it was apparently invoked owing to the circumstances surrounding the crafting of the MOA-AD and negotiations undertaken with the MILF that had been hidden from public view. Thus, weighed against the right of the public for general information on matters that affect, say 700 barangays in Muslim Mindanao, the Court has opined thus, that – “The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of a positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined”
Certainly, the finer points of the decision itself are for legal scholars and practitioners to review or for Members of Congress to look into in aid of legislation. Suffice for us to know that the Supreme Court, as we should have expected, decided in the manner it did, declaring as unconstitutional the MOA-AD. It provided soothing comfort to the tendency of the present dispensation to approach matters of grave societal concern via this vicious ‘violate now, validate later’. It sets dangerous precedent. With our national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic having been defended against such dubious agreement or compromise, this comeuppance ought to usher well for RP’s realpolitik in the international scene. Not remotely, the image of the bench has been raised some notches higher in the bar of public opinion.
With this development, let it serve public notice that from hereon, no one official or officials in the Executive Department should even tinker with the Constitution which should be preserved for all time. There is reason to believe that the image of all other courts lower than the High Tribunal should regain the high trust ratings they deserve. It is time to trust the judicial branch of government in an institutional if normative scheme of check and balance as well as separation of powers in the three co-equal branches of government.
There is even further reason to hope that cases will not be decided based on patronage politics. For now, people ought to be consulted on matters that affect them, directly or indirectly. Absent this democratic criterion, any agreement, compromise, or law that will be erected may be deemed unconstitutional. The decision of the High Tribunal shall serve as a lamp post to guide other agencies of government, officials and personages within the ambit of authority and power as they go about their official functions and mandate.
Viewed within the periphery, there are still some crucial cases to be decided upon by the High Court. Again, how it will decide on these cases will be cast in the realm of public opinion. Nothing can seem to be hidden from public view owing to the sensitivity and the social consequences of any given judicial question. As the final arbiter of all questions judicial in nature, the position as would be embraced by the Supreme Court via a scheme of majority rule – ought only to be respected. This is how democracy works.
The perceived paralyzing effect of too much politics, too much patronage – thought to have even infected the judiciary – is proven wrong with this 14 October decision. In the end, there cannot be an independent Muslim state, a separate justice system, a separate police force. There cannot be a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. To do so, would be tantamount to judicial overstretching, or so I think. God bless RP that subsequent decisions will have to be decided according to prescribed norms of law as well as of the higher dictates of conscience. Now we can be sure, it is not easy to put square pegs in round holes as Malacanang through the actuation of some of its officials in government appear to indicate. More power to the High Court!
Primer,
My answer to your comment above is contained in my new FV entry here.